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Abstract: The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or 
the end, of the Greek polis is increasingly being abandoned, and some scholars are abandoning 
also the view that Athens was great and glorious in the ﬁ fth century but degenerate in the fourth. 
However, the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of that ultimate freedom which 
it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early ﬁ fth century and the late fourth, free-
dom not merely from receiving orders from others but to give orders to others, and in this paper 
I explore the reasons for that change. Some scholars believe that fourth-century Athens was led 
astray by “the ghost of empire;” others believe that the Athenians were unwilling to pay for a re-
sponse which could have defeated Philip; I argue that except in the years after Leuctra the ghost 
of empire did not have malign effects, and even with more expenditure Athens could not have 
defeated Philip. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Athens in the fourth century, but 
Sparta’s success in the Hellespont in 387 and the resulting King’s Peace, the rule in Macedon of 
Philip II, who was too clever diplomatically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians, 
and Alexander’s succession in 336 and his success and survival in his campaigns, placed Athens 
in situations which it could not overcome.
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The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or the 
end, of the Greek polis is increasingly and I think rightly being abandoned.2 Similarly 
some scholars, though not all,3 are abandoning the view (inherited from the fourth-cen-
tury orators) that Athens was great and glorious in the ﬁ fth century but degenerate in the 
fourth. It is, however, true that the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of 
that ultimate freedom which it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early 
ﬁ fth century and the late fourth, freedom not merely from receiving orders from others 
1  This paper has been lightly revised and updated from my contribution, with the title “Athens in the 
Fourth Century: What – If Anything – Went Wrong?” to a conference at Sunium organised by Mr. A. L. Pierris 
in July 2006 on “Mind, Might, Money: The Secular Triad in Golden-Age Athens;” the conference proceed-
ings have not yet been published. I thank Mr. Pierris and all those involved in the Sunium conference; and 
Prof. Sprawski for inviting me to contribute to this volume and accepting this paper.
2  For my views see Rhodes 1994 (written in 1981/1982): 589–591; Rhodes/Lewis 1997.
3  For recent expressions of the view that fourth-century Athens was degenerate see, e.g., Samons 2004; 
Romilly 2005.
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but to give orders to others:4 archein gave way to what could be seen by comparison as 
douleuein. In this paper I want to focus on the reasons for that change.
A quarter of a century ago G.L. Cawkwell wrote “Notes on the Failure of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy”, concluding that at ﬁ rst the Second League was a success and 
Athens kept the promises made at its foundation; but that after the defeat of Sparta at 
Leuctra had ended for ever the threat which the League had been founded to counter 
Athens revived its old imperial ambitions and practices, bankrupting itself and alienating 
its allies, so that when the opportunity arose several allies fought their way out in the So-
cial War, and what survived of the League after that was of no great signiﬁ cance.5 More 
recently E. Badian has seen a far more pervasive inﬂ uence of “The Ghost of Empire” in 
fourth-century Athenian foreign policy, claiming that again and again a success led to 
hopes of imperial power which in turn led to nemesis, with a downward spiral marked by 
increasingly lower peaks and deeper troughs.6 First came the Corinthian War and the na-
val campaign of Thrasybulus; then the League, which Badian sees as an attempt to make 
Athens a great naval power again, even if at ﬁ rst the promises were kept; later the impe-
rial policies embarked on after Leuctra, in particular the attempt to regain Amphipolis 
and the disastrous attempt to do a deal with Philip at the beginning of his reign. After the 
Social War Eubulus, with his turn from imperial adventures to ﬁ nancial recovery, is seen 
as “the ﬁ rst major politician in Athens who had personally exorcised the ghost”.7 After 
the middle of the century there were still ambitious decrees and campaigns by ambitious 
generals, but the citizens would no longer pay for them; there was Demosthenes’ opposi-
tion to Philip, the “Periclean” policy of Lycurgus and Demades; and ﬁ nally the ghost led 
Athens to the Lamian War and to “political and military destruction”.
Other scholars have painted very different pictures. L.J. Samons, in a book whose 
overriding purpose is to suggest that what was great about classical Athens was not its 
democracy, condemns that concentration on ﬁ nancial prosperity which Badian sees as 
the dawning of realism. The democracy with its payments to citizens had been created in 
the ﬁ fth century when the payments could be funded by the Delian League; in the fourth 
century the funding had to come from taxes and the richer citizens, and the poor would 
not give up their subsidies and the rich would not pay the heavier taxes which (Samons 
thinks) would have made effective resistance to Philip possible. Samons also thinks that 
increasing risks of prosecution for failure deterred men of sufﬁ cient calibre from putting 
themselves forward as military and political leaders.8
For yet another view we may turn to P. Harding. He rejects the usual concentra-
tion on leading ﬁ gures and what are believed to be their policies, and also the claim of 
H. Montgomery, echoing Demosthenes, that the Athenian democracy was structurally 
incapable of maintaining an effective foreign policy in the face of a ruler such as Philip.9 
4  For this view of the highest kind of freedom see Hdt. 1.210.2, 9.122.3, cf. 6.109.3; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.8; 
Thuc. 1.76.1, 2.63.1, 3.45.6, 6.18.3, 87.2, 7.75.7, 8.68.4; cf. 5.9.9 on what was possible for lesser states; Pl. 
Grg. 452 d; Dem. 22. Androt. 68; Lycurg. Leoc. 42.
5  Cawkwell 1981.
6  Badian 1995.
7  Ibidem: 101.
8  Samons 2004: esp. 95–99, 143–162.
9  Cf. Montgomery 1983. Demosthenes contrasting decision-making by Philip and by Athens: esp. 18. 
Crown 235–236, 19. Embassy 184–186. I agree with Hansen 2005 that in so far as this was a problem it was 
a problem for any constitutionally governed polis, not speciﬁ cally a problem for a democratic polis.
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Harding takes a “bottom up” view, and argues that “the overall direction of Athenian for-
eign policy was by the people in the Assembly,” and that after the King’s Peace Athens 
pursued a consistent and often though not always successful policy. This was a defensive 
policy which involved identifying and protecting Athens’ vital interests as far as limited 
resources allowed; by 340 “the Athenians had been so successful in containing and frus-
trating Philip that he had lost the initiative;” he was forced to invade Greece and ﬁ ght 
at Chaeronea, where he won – but he risked real disaster if he did not win. For Athens 
Chaeronea was not the end, but by the time of the Lamian War the balance of power had 
changed too much for the attempt to strike back to succeed.10
So here I wish to ask once more how successful or unsuccessful Athens was in the 
fourth-century world, and why.
* * *
The consequences for Athens of defeat in the Peloponnesian War were much less 
drastic than we might have expected. Plague and war casualties had at best halved the 
number of citizens, and in this respect there was to be little recovery.11 The city was not 
destroyed as some of Sparta’s allies would have liked, but it lost all its overseas pos-
sessions, the long walls and the Piraeus walls were demolished, the navy was reduced 
to twelve ships, Athens was made a subordinate ally of Sparta, and although there was 
probably no formal requirement of constitutional change in the peace treaty12 the oligar-
chy of the Thirty was set up under pressure from Lysander. Yet after a year the restoration 
of the democracy was facilitated by Pausanias; there was probably little long-term dam-
age to Athenian agriculture;13 the 2% tax was collected on 1,650 talents’ worth of trade in 
402/401 and on over 1,800 talents’ worth in 401/400.14 As for foreign affairs, Athens du-
tifully assisted in Sparta’s war against Elis c. 401, and sent oligarchically-minded caval-
rymen to Asia Minor with Thibron in 400;15 but before long there were the beginnings of 
a move away from Sparta. In 397 ofﬁ cers and weapons were sent to Conon for the ﬂ eet 
which he was assembling for Pharnabazus, and envoys were dispatched to the Persian 
King but caught by the Spartans;16 in 396 reinforcements were not sent to Asia with Ag-
esilaus, and Demaenetus set out with a trireme to join Conon, though when that became 
known there was a panic in Athens.17 In 395 Athens was drawn fairly readily into joining 
Sparta’s disaffected allies in the Corinthian War, and Xenophon represents the Thebans 
10  Harding 1995: both quotations from p. 124.
11  See, e.g., Hansen 1988: 14–28 (c. 60,000 in 431); 1986 (c. 30,000 after the war).
12  Silence of Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; Diod. Sic. 13.107.4; Andoc. 3. Peace 11–12; Plut. Lys. 14.8; contr. Ath. 
Pol. 34.3; Diod. Sic. 14.3.2, 6; Just. 5.8.5: see Rhodes 1981: 427.
13  Hanson 1998 is not in this respect refuted by Thorne 2001. The territory of Attica was, of course, the 
same after the Peloponnesian War as before; there were only half as many citizens after the war as before 
to share it (cf. above with n. 11), but Athens had no overseas possessions immediately after the war and not 
many other than Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros at any time in the fourth century.
14  Andoc. 1. Mysteries 133–134. That these were very large ﬁ gures for Athens just after the Pelopon-
nesian War is stressed by Hansen 2006: 92.
15  Elis: Xen. Hell. 3.2.25; Thibron: Xen. Hell. 3.1.4.
16  Hell. Oxy. 10.1 Chambers.
17  Agesilaus: Paus. 3.9.2–3; Demaenetus: Hell. Oxy. 9 Chambers.
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as saying, “We all know that you would like to recover the empire you had before.”18 We 
do not know how soon Athens started rebuilding its navy, but the rebuilding of the walls 
was already under way at the end of 395/394, before the battle of Cnidus,19 the sanctu-
ary of Apollo on Delos was in Athens’ hands again by 393/392,20 and the north-Aegean 
islands of Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros had been regained by 392/391.21
The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is one of the few texts which suggest that the Athenians 
were divided on class lines, with the “many and democratic” soon inclined to war against 
Sparta while the “respectable and propertied” were in 396 content with the status quo. 
Thrasybulus was on the side of caution in 396,22 but in 395 he was in favour of joining 
in the Corinthian War and himself commanded the Athenian forces in Boeotia.23 It seems 
clear that within a few years majority opinion shifted from subservience to Sparta to op-
position to Sparta, and the main distinction is simply that some men were quicker than 
others to change.
Relations with Persia were complicated. Sparta, to gain Persian support against Ath-
ens in the Peloponnesian War, had undertaken to return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; but 
from 400 it was ﬁ ghting for the Asiatic Greeks against Persia, though from time to time 
pausing to consider a compromise deal. Persia therefore supported Sparta’s enemies in 
Greece: it was probably in 397 or 396 and by Pharnabazus, the satrap of Dascylium, that 
Timocrates of Rhodes was sent to Greece with Persian money.24 In 398 Pharnabazus had 
obtained the King’s permission to raise a ﬂ eet, which was commanded by the Athenian 
refugee Conon, with the support of Conon’s and Athens’ friend Evagoras of Salamis in 
Cyprus, and in 394 that ﬂ eet defeated the Spartans at Cnidus. This was a Persian victory 
over Greeks, but it suited Athens to represent it as a Greek victory over Spartan impe-
rialism and to award extravagant honours to Conon and Evagoras; Spartan harmosts 
were driven out, and Phranabazus promised to leave the akropoleis unfortiﬁ ed and the 
cities autonomous.25 The inscription on Conon’s statue base claimed that “Conon freed 
the allies of Athens:” Seager cynically comments, “The unfortunate break in Athenian 
domination was now at an end and could henceforth be disregarded.”26
But in 392, with Sparta making no progress either in Asia or in Greece, Antalcidas 
made his ﬁ rst attempt at securing a common peace treaty, by which Sparta would after 
all return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia in return for Persian support in Greece. That ﬁ rst 
attempt failed, and the King sent Struthas to continue the war; but in 392/391 Sparta 
had a second attempt, with concessions which Andocides and his fellow envoys were 
willing to accept, but the Athenian assembly on account of the proposed abandonment 
18  Xen. Hell. 3.5.10.
19  IG II2 1656–7 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 9.
20  IG II2 1634 = I. Délos 97; contra I. Délos 87 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 3, of 403 or shortly after.
21  Andoc. 3. Peace 12, 14.
22  Hell. Oxy. 9.2–3 Chambers; cf. Ar. Eccl. 197–198.
23  In favour: Xen. Hell. 3.5.16; commanding: Plut. Lys. 29.1; Paus. 3.5.4.
24  Hell. Oxy. 10.2, 5 Chambers; Polyaen. 1.48.3 contra Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Plut. Artox. 20.4; Paus. 3.9.8. 
See, e.g., Krentz 1995: 195.
25  Honours for Conon: Isoc. 9. Evagoras 56–57; Dem. 20. Leptines 68–70; Paus. 1.3.2; for Evagoras: 
Lewis/Stroud 1979 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 11; Isoc. 9. Evagoras 56, 68. Harmosts, Pharnabazus’ prom-
ise: Xen. Hell. 4.8.1–2.
26  Statue base: Dem. 20. Leptines 69; Seager 1997: 103.
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of the Asiatic Greeks was not.27 Athens was still opposed to Sparta but now not so well 
disposed towards Persia: Conon had been arrested by Antalcidas’ friend Tiribazus in 
392;28 Evagoras, who had been increasing his power in Cyprus, was from 391 onwards 
perceived by the Persians as a rebel who had to be dealt with, and Athens sent support 
to him, c. 390, intercepted by Persia’s enemy Sparta, and c. 388.29 It is against this back-
ground that we must set Thrasybulus’ campaign of c. 390: whatever may have been the 
case in 395, by the end of the 390’s Athens was rebuilding its walls and its navy and had 
begun to recover old possessions and to hope to recover more,30 and it no longer thought 
that to oppose Sparta it needed to be on good terms with Persia. There can be no doubt 
about Thrasybulus’ imperial ambitions:31 his campaign, ostensibly to support democrats 
against pro-Spartan oligarchs in Rhodes, took him from Thrace and Thasos, Byzantium 
and Calchedon in the north to Aspendus, well outside the Aegean, in the south, and in-
volved the revival of Alcibiades’ 10% Bosporus tax, a 5% tax in the Aegean, a claim by 
Athens to exile men from the territory of Athens and its allies, and a willingness to im-
pose governors and garrisons.32 Thrasybulus was killed. Some of his subordinates were 
recalled and prosecuted,33 but this does not seem to indicate disapproval of the policy: 
the Athenians supported Evagoras, and in the months before the King’s Peace they talked 
of “not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians,” and for Clazomenae they insisted on Thra-
sybulus’ 5% tax and considered but decided against sending a governor and garrison.34
What brought this to an end was not any change of heart in Athens or any funda-
mental weakness but the large result of a small but important episode: in 387 Antalcidas 
regained control of the Hellespont for Sparta;35 Tiribazus was by then again satrap in 
Sardis, and they were in a strong enough position to obtain from the King and impose on 
the Greeks terms almost the same as those ﬁ rst attempted in 392 (apart from the conces-
sion of the three north-Aegean islands to Athens). The Asiatic Greeks were “given up 
to the barbarians,” but Agesilaus notoriously proclaimed that Sparta was not Medising 
but Persia was Laconising: except in Persia’s sphere and Athens’ three islands, all cities 
and islands were to be autonomous, and Agesilaus insisted that this requirement entailed 
the dissolution of the Boeotian federation and of the union of Corinth and Argos.36 This 
was followed by a Spartan war of revenge against Mantinea, which ended with Man-
27  I accept the use of Philoch, FGrH 328 F 149 to date Andoc. 3. Peace, with, e.g., Keen 1995, 1998, 
against, e.g., Badian 1991, and against the argument that Andoc. 3 is a later rhetorical exercise advanced by 
Harris 2000.
28  Xen. Hell. 4.8.16.
29  C. 390: Xen. Hell. 4.8.24; c. 388: Xen. Hell. 5.1.10–12. The chronology of Persia’s war against 
Evagoras was settled by Spek 1998: 240–251.
30  Andoc. 3. Peace 15 suggests that by 392/391 there was talk of regaining the Chersonese and other 
places.
31  See Seager 1997; Cawkwell 1976.
32  10% tax: Dem. 20. Leptines 60; 5% tax: IG II2 24.a.5–6, 28 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 18.7–8; 
exile: IG II2 24.b.4–6; governors and garrisons: IG II2 28 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 18.13–17 with 22–5.
33  Lys. 28. Ergocles; 29. Philocrates.
34  Erythrae: SEG XXVI,1282 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 17.11–14; Clazomenae: IG II2 28 = Rhodes/
Osborne 2003: no. 18.
35  Xen. Hell. 5.1.6–7, 25–28; for Athenian recriminations see IG II2 29 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 19.
36  Persia Laconising: Plut. Ages. 23.4; Artox. 22.4; Apophth. Lac. 213b; Boeotia and Corinth-and-Argos: 
Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–4.
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tinea’s being split into its component villages, probably by a perverse application of the 
autonomy principle.37
The King’s Peace was a new kind of treaty, with its stipulation about the Greek states 
in general, and what Athens could do and what Athens should do in this new world was 
not immediately clear. We have a fragmentary decree of 386/385 concerning land on 
Lemnos, one of Athens’ three islands. In the same year Athens praised the Thracian ruler 
Hebryzelmis, and conﬁ rmed for him the honours voted to his forebears, but as Sinclair 
stressed the decree says nothing about an alliance.38 In 384/383 a way forward was found 
in the alliance with Chios, perhaps on the initiative of Chios, which was a defensive al-
liance “on terms of freedom and autonomy, not contravening any of the things written 
on the stelai about the peace;” Methymna at least, and perhaps other states, also made an 
alliance with Athens.39
I am among those who believe that Lysias’ (33) Olympic Speech is to be dated not to 
388 but to 384, and that the disgraceful state of affairs of which he is complaining is that 
after the King’s Peace:40 as Gorgias had done already in the last years of the Pelopon-
nesian War,41 Lysias calls on the Greeks to stop ﬁ ghting amongst themselves and unite 
against the barbarians, and in this new world and at a panhellenic gathering he regards 
the Spartans as the leaders of the Greeks.42 Isocrates in his (4) Panegyric of c. 380 con-
trasts the disgrace of the King’s Peace with the glories of the (actual or invented) mid-
ﬁ fth-century Peace of Callias: at the beginning he says it is a commonplace of speakers 
that the Greeks ought not to ﬁ ght against one another but to unite and ﬁ ght against the 
Persians, and he goes on to say that this requires cooperation between Athens and Sparta 
– which turns out to mean that it requires acceptance by Sparta that Athens rather than 
Sparta deserves to be the leader of the Greeks. Much of the speech is then devoted to 
a defence of ﬁ fth-century Athens and the Delian League.43
Athens did not support Mantinea, but did take in refugees afterwards.44 It sympathised 
with Olynthus when Sparta attacked it in 382, probably again with the ostensible inten-
tion of enforcing the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace, but there is no good rea-
son for dating the fragment of an inscribed alliance to this time.45 It did, however, take 
37  Note the Athenians’ fear that if they supported Mantinea they might be in breach of the peace: Diod. 
Sic. 15.5.5.
38  Lemnos: IG II2 30; Hebryzelmis: IG II2 31 = Tod 117, with Sinclair 1978: 47–49.
39  Chios: IG II2 34 and 35 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 20; Methymna: IG II2 42 = Rhodes/Osborne 
2003: no. 23.4–6.
40  388: Diod. Sic. 14.109.3; 384: Grote 1869/1884: ix. 291–292 n. 2; x. 312–313 n. 1 = 1888: viii. 72 
n. 2; ix. 34–5 n. 1.
41  Gorgias, Vorsokr.6 82A1.4 (Olympic Speech, to be dated 408 with Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893, I: 
172–173 with n. 35), 1.5 (Funeral Speech, of unknown date).
42  Lys. 33. Olymp. 6.
43  King’s Peace and Peace of Callias: Isoc. 4. Panegyric 115–121, cf. 175–180; commonplace: § 15; 
cooperation between Athens and Sparta: §§ 16–17; Athens ought to be leader: § 18 and much of speech, 
cf. 15. Antidosis 57–62.
44  IG II2 33.7–8.
45  Athens and Olynthus: Xen. Hell. 5.2.15; Sparta appealed to by Chalcidian cities: Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–23, 
by Macedon (which may also be true): Diod. Sic. 15.19.3; alliance: IG II2 36 = Tod 119, both dating it 
384/383, 376/375, e.g. Lewis 1954: 33, and later dates have been considered (Zahrnt 1971: 124–127 favours 
the mid 370’s but restores without an archon’s name).
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in refugees from Thebes when that city was occupied by Sparta.46 That led to support 
for Thebes in 379/378 when some of the refugees set out from Athens and overthrew 
the pro-Spartan régime.47 What changed everything was Sphodrias’ raid on Attica, mis-
placed chronologically by Diodorus.48 It was that which gave the Athenians the indigna-
tion and courage to declare that Sparta, while posing as the enforcer of the King’s Peace, 
was itself in breach of the peace, and that they would head a new league to uphold the 
peace against the Spartans. The prospectus49 shows two particular concerns: to spell out 
what was meant by the principle of autonomy, which Sparta had been exploiting since 
the peace was made; and to promise that Athens would not do various things for which 
it had been unpopular in the Delian League. What is surprising is that most of the states 
which joined the League in time to be included in its list of members (i.e., probably, by 
375) were states of the Aegean and its Thracian coast, which as far as we can tell were 
not seriously threatened by Sparta after the King’s Peace. However, the campaign of 376 
was to show that, if Agesilaus was obsessed with Thebes, other Spartans had not given 
up on the Aegean;50 and it may be that even before 376 the members recruited by Athens 
felt more vulnerable than our evidence allows us to see.
How lively was the ghost of empire? Isocrates provides evidence that some people 
were thinking of empire and of war against Persia; but Athens’ practice since the King’s 
Peace had been very cautious, and the Second League was founded not to ﬁ ght Isocrates’ 
war against Persia but to uphold the King’s Peace against Sparta, and with promises 
that this league would not become an empire. In many respects the Athenians do seem 
to have behaved virtuously in the 370’s, and it is striking that in spite of their past they 
were able to build up a sizeable league. Garrisons to protect Abdera against the Thra-
cians, and in Cephallenia and perhaps elsewhere in the west, were contrary to the foun-
dation promises, but probably in the particular situations in which they were installed 
they were welcomed – by most people in Abdera and by the supporters of Athens in the 
west.51 Why additions to the list of members inscribed with the prospectus ceased after 
(probably) 375 remains a mystery, but the evidence suggests that, although that list omits 
Corcyra and contains only one city of Cephallenia, Corcyra and the whole of Cephal-
lenia did eventually become members, and there is no need to rule out other additions.52 
Stasis in Paros was dealt with not by Athens but by the synedrion of the League, though 
46  Xen. Hell. 5.2.31; Plut. Pelop. 6.3–5.
47  The support appears more ofﬁ cial in Diod. Sic. 15.25.4–26.3, cf. Din. 1 Demosthenes 38–39, than in 
the different account of Xen. Hell. 5.4.9. Buck 1992, cf. 1994: 85–86 suggests that the Athenian generals were 
sent ofﬁ cially to the frontier region and on their own initiative went into Boeotia.
48  Diod. Sic. 15.28, 29.5–8. On the chronology I agree with, e.g., Rice 1975: 124–127 (but not with 
his putting even the expedition of 25.4–26.3 after Sphodrias’ raid); Badian 1995: 89–90 n. 34, against, e.g., 
Cawkwell 1973: 51–56; Cargill 1981: 58–59, who defend Diodorus’ placing of the foundation before Spho-
drias’ raid.
49  IG II2 43 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 22.
50  Xen. Hell. 5.4.58–61; Diod. Sic. 15.34.3–35.3.
51  Abdera: Diod. Sic. 15.36.4; Cephallenia etc.: IG II2 98 = Agora XVI: 46.16–17.
52  IG II2 96 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 24, 97 = Tod 127, 98 = Agora XVI: 43. See especially Tuplin 
1984: 553–561, against Cargill 1981: 64–74, 109–111.
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afterwards Paros was said to be a colony of Athens and was called on to send offerings 
to Athenian festivals.53
The promise that there would be no tribute is so emphatic that I think at the outset 
there can have been no compulsory levies of money under any name: a complaint in 375 
that the Thebans were not contributing money towards the ﬂ eet in a campaign which they 
had instigated perhaps points to voluntary arrangements, but it may well have been as-
sumed that in general each allied state would provide and fund its own forces. Syntaxeis, 
“contributions,” were being collected in 373, and Timotheus’ problems then in raising 
a ﬂ eet to go to Corcyra make that a likely time for the introduction of the new system.54 
Our little evidence for the syntaxeis suggests that they never yielded much money. The 
Athenians themselves reorganised the collection of eisphora from rich citizens and met-
ics, grouping the payers in symmoriai, in 378/377.55 In 374/373 the proceeds of the grain 
tax from the north-Aegean islands were ring-fenced for the stratiotic fund.56 The Athe-
nians’ ﬁ nancial difﬁ culties even in the early years of the League show that, whether their 
policies were altruistic or selﬁ sh, memories and/or hopes of naval power led them into 
campaigning beyond their ﬁ nancial means: to that extent at least the ghost was at work.
Leuctra and what followed in the next few years transformed the League and Athens’ 
policy. Sparta was defeated in battle, it was deprived of Messenia, and a treaty involving 
Corinth and other states but not Sparta ended the Peloponnesian League – in each case 
not at the instance of Athens and its allies but of Thebes. As in the 390’s, some Athenians 
made the change sooner and more readily than others, but in 369 Athens and Sparta 
became allies, and in 367 Thebes offered itself to Persia as the new agent of the King’s 
Peace and started to indicate that Athens’ naval power was its next target, so that Athens 
became less enthusiastic for the King’s Peace. What was to become of a League which 
had been founded to oppose Sparta and to uphold the King’s Peace? One might well 
ask. Mytilene did ask, and unfortunately there survives from Callistratus’ response only 
the beginning, which justiﬁ es the anti-Spartan policy of the 370’s, and what Callistratus 
went on to say about the new world after Leuctra has not survived.57
Immediately after Leuctra the Athenians had hoped that they could ﬁ ll the power 
vacuum, and had themselves organised the common peace of autumn 371. I believe, 
ﬁ rst, that swearing “to abide by the treaty which the King sent down and by the decrees 
53  SEG XXXI, 67 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 29.
54  Cf., e.g., Cawkwell 1963a: 91–93, contra, e.g., Badian 1995: 91–92 n. 37. Thebans: Xen. Hell. 6.2.1 
with 5.4.62; syntaxeis in 373: [Dem.] 49. Timotheus 49; Timotheus’ difﬁ culties: Xen. Hell. 6.2.12–13; Diod. 
Sic. 15.47.2–3.
55  Clidemus, FGrH 323 F 8.
56  SEG XLVII, 96 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 26.51–5, the earliest surviving mention of this fund. In 
lines 55–61 other sums are directed åròô[íäéïßêçóéí which I take to mean that they are to be part of the 
ordinary ﬁ nances of the city, received by the apodektai and passed on to different spending authorities in the 
merismos.
57  IG II2 107 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 31.35 sqq., of 369/368. It is interesting that in the prospectus 
of the League, IG II2 43 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 22, the pro-King’s-Peace lines 12–15 were deleted but 
the anti-Spartan lines 9–12 were not: the talks in Persia in 367 and the willingness of one of the Athenian del-
egates to acquiesce provoked an angry reaction (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33–8; Plut. Pelop. 30; Dem. 19. Embassy 31, 
137, 191), and I imagine that in that reaction the one clause was deleted and the thought that another clause 
also had become embarrassingly obsolete did not occur.
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of Athens and the allies” means renewing the King’s Peace and strengthening it with 
the interpretation of freedom and autonomy given in the League’s prospectus and other 
documents, but not that the Persians were on this occasion directly involved or that the 
participants – including Sparta – were all enrolled in the League;58 secondly, that later 
claims that the King and all the Greeks acknowledged Athens’ right to Amphipolis and 
the Chersonese are Athenian interpretation of a clause in the treaty that the participants 
should V÷åéíô@Uáõô™í possess not just what they possessed at the time but what was 
theirs by right.59
In the middle of the ﬁ fth century, after Cimon’s death, the Athenians (with or without 
a Peace of Callias) discontinued the Delian League’s regular campaigning against Per-
sia, but after a little uncertainty they kept the League in being as an Athenian empire.60 
In the same way after the unifying purpose of the Second League had disappeared the 
Athenians kept the League in being for their own purposes, and the 360’s is the decade 
in which the ghost of empire walked most visibly. Athens began ﬁ ghting for Amphipolis 
in 368, and in the Hellespont in 365; it had some successes as well as some failures, but 
did not succeed in gaining either Amphipolis or the Chersonese. On the west side of the 
Aegean Athens tangled with Macedon and Thessaly at the same time as Thebes: in Thes-
saly Thebes supported the koinon while Athens supported the tyrants of Pherae. On the 
east side, since Thebes was now the friend of the Persian King, Athens and Sparta sup-
ported the rebel satraps. In 366–365 Timotheus took Samos from the Persians (who un-
der the terms of the King’s Peace ought not to have had it) – but then it was not liberated 
but was taken over as an Athenian cleruchy.61 In 364/363, when Timotheus had moved 
to the western Aegean, he captured Torone and Potidaea, and in 361, at the invitation of 
Athens’ supporters there, cleruchs were sent to Potidaea too.62 Samos and Potidaea were 
not members of the Second Athenian League, but all of this must still have seemed very 
alarming to the members.
In other ways Athens’ actions did impinge directly on the members. On the island 
of Ceos there were four cities, and Athens preferred to deal with them as separate cit-
ies, but they or at any rate three of them preferred to function as a single federal state: 
this may lie behind the two stages of revolt in 363/362, after which all major lawsuits 
were to be transferred to Athenian courts.63 In 361/360 Chares intervened in Corcyra, 
supporting an oligarchic revolt, “as a result of which the Athenian demos gained a bad 
reputation among the allies.”64 According to Aeneas Tacticus Chares was in Corcyra as 
58  Xen. Hell. 6.5.1–3, quoting § 2. Cf. Sordi 1951; Ryder 1965: 71–74, 131–133; contra Lewis 1997: 
29–31.
59  Cf. Jehne 1992; Rhodes 2008, and 2010: 233.
60  I belong to the minority which does not believe in a Peace of Callias: see Rhodes 2010: 51–56.
61  Capture: Dem. 15. Freedom of Rhodians 9; Isoc. 15. Antidosis 108, 111; cleruchy: Diod. Sic. 18.18.9, 
Str. 638/14.1.18; Arist. Rhet. 2.1384 b 32–35, cf. schol. Aeschin. 1. Timarchus 53 (121 Dilts).
62  Capture: Diod. Sic. 15.81.6; Isoc. 15. Antidosis 108, 113; Polyaenus Strat. 3.10.15; cleruchy: IG II2 
116 = Tod 147.
63  IG II2 111 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 39; cf. decrees of separate cities IG II2 1128 = Rhodes/Osborne 
2003: no. 40; stipulation that the Ceans were to be administered “by cities” IG II2 404.13 = SEG XXXIX, 
73.14 (perhaps mid 350’s, though at the SEG reference 363/362 is suggested). The city which tended not to 
join the others was Poeessa.
64  Diod. Sic. 15.95.3 (quotation); Aen. Tact. 11.13–15.
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a garrison commander. We certainly ﬁ nd garrisons in the 350’s: in Andros during the So-
cial War, paid for out of the syntaxeis with the approval of the synedrion; but in Arcesine 
on Amorgus probably before the outbreak of the Social War, and at the expense of the 
Arcesinians.65
Thebes and Athens began their rival involvement with Thessaly and Macedon in 
369 and 368, and it was in 367 that the Thebans won the support of Persia and proposed 
common peace terms which would include the disbanding of the Athenian navy.66 In 366 
they exploited a dispute to take Oropus from Athens.67 In the years that followed Epami-
nondas urged the Thebans to build dockyards and a hundred new triremes; he tried to win 
over members of the Athenian League, with a naval campaign to the eastern Aegean in 
364 which scared off an Athenian squadron.68 It may have been this challenge to Athens 
which encouraged the Ceans to revolt when they did. To increase Athens’ problems, after 
the Thebans’ defeat of Alexander of Pherae in 364 he turned against Athens, attacking 
Tenos in 362 and Peparethus and even the Piraeus in 361, in response to which the Athe-
nians switched to a short-lived alliance with the Thessalian koinon.69
From the time of Timotheus’ siege of Samos, winter 366/365, we have the begin-
ning of a decree for Erythrae, on the mainland opposite Chios, connected in some way 
with him: the substance has been lost but Timotheus perhaps raised money there for the 
siege.70 There are other signs that Athens continually had problems in funding its cam-
paigns: Timotheus in the north-western Aegean issued bronze coins; Apollodorus reports 
a shortage of public money to pay ships’ crews in 362–360.71 There had been a shortfall 
in the payment of the property tax, eisphora. 364/363 sees the earliest mention of pro-
eisphora, the liturgy through which the three richest members of each symmoria were 
required to advance the whole sum due from their symmoria and were left to recover the 
other members’ share themselves.72 In the early 350’s there were 14 talents unpaid out 
of a total of about 300 talents – from 378/377 to perhaps the institution of proeisphora – 
and this was thought serious enough for Androtion to propose the creation of and himself 
to serve on a commission to collect the arrears (about half of the sum outstanding was 
collected).73 The trierarchic system, under which originally one man had been given the 
65  Andros: IG II2 123 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 52 (357/356); Arcesine: IG XII.vii 5 = Rhodes/Os-
borne 2003: no. 51 (Androtion praised perhaps 357/356 after a term of at least two years).
66  Xen. Hell. 7.1.36–7; Plut. Pel. 30, cf. Dem. 19. Embassy 31, 137, 191.
67  Xen. Hell. 7.4.1; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1; schol. Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 85 (186 Dilts); Agatharchides, 
FGrH 86 F 8 with Buckler 1977.
68  Diod. Sic. 15.78.4–79.1; Isoc. 5. Philip 53; Plut. Philop. 14.2–3. Epaminondas was made proxenos of 
Cnidus: SEG XLIV, 901; the Boeotians appointed a Byzantine proxenos: SEG XXXIV, 355 (neither inscrip-
tion precisely dated). By the late 350’s Byzantium had synedroi in what was probably a league of Thebes’ 
allies: IG VII 2418 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 57.11, 24; cf. Lewis 1990; contr. Buckler 1980: 222–233, 
and 2000 = Bucker/Beck 2008: 165–179.
69  362: [Dem.] 50. Polycles 4; 361: Diod. Sic. 15.95.1–3; Polyaenus Strat. 6.2; Athens and koinon: IG II2 
116 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 44 (361/360).
70  IG II2 108; generals raising money from Chios, Erythrae and wherever they could: Dem. 8. Cherson-
ese 24–25.
71  Timotheus’ bronze coinage: [Arist.] Oec. 2.1350a 23–9, cf. CAH.2 plates v–vi no. 227; Apollodorus: 
[Dem.] 50. Polycles, e.g. 10–20.
72  Proeisphora mentioned 364/363: Isae. 6. Philoctemon 60; a date of 370–366 for the institution is 
suggested by Brun 1985.
73  Dem. 22. Androtion 42–46.
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general and ﬁ nancial responsibility for a warship for a year, was under increasing strain: 
sharing the burden of one ship between two men had become common; in 358/357 a law 
of Periander organised the 1,200 hundred richest citizens in symmoriai, after which there 
were still trierarchs but some of each year’s costs were shared among the whole body of 
1,200; and in 354/353 Demosthenes unsuccessfully proposed changes in the new sys-
tem.74 Another source of emergency funding was an appeal for voluntary contributions, 
epidoseis: the word and lists of men who gave and men who promised but failed to give 
are attested for 394, but Demosthenes refers to what was in some sense the ﬁ rst appeal 
in 357.75
The 350’s began with two protracted crises for Athens, of which one eventually turned 
out well but the other turned out badly. Late in 360 the Thracian king Cotys (whose sister 
Iphicrates had married) was murdered, and his son Cersebleptes was challenged by two 
other claimants, Amadocus and Berisades: it took Athens until the winter of 357/356 to 
achieve what was considered a satisfactory settlement, that for some purposes the three 
men were regarded as joint rulers but essentially Cersebleptes had the east, towards the 
Hellespont, Amadocus had the middle and Berisades had the west, and Greek cities on 
the coast had obligations both to Athens and its League and to the Thracian rulers.76 In 
359 Perdiccas of Macedon was killed in a battle against the Illyrians, and the throne 
passed not to his young son but to his brother Philip. Again there were rival claimants, 
and Athens backed one of them, Argaeus. To undermine Athens’ support for Argaeus, 
Philip allowed the Athenians to think that he would let them regain Amphipolis, perhaps 
in exchange for Pydna, on the coast; in 357, once Argaeus had been defeated, he took 
Amphipolis for himself – and later Pydna, Potidaea (which he gave to Olynthus) and 
Methone.77 Athens responded by declaring war on Philip, and, although other preoccu-
pations prevented it from prosecuting the war, the demand for Amphipolis became ever 
more insistent.
There was one last deceptive success: in 357 Athens quickly seized an opportunity 
and brought back into the League the cities of Euboea, which had sided with Thebes 
74  Shared trierarchy ﬁ rst attested in the last years of the Peloponnesian War: Lys. 32. Diogiton 24–26; 
referred to in the 340’s as normal practice before Periander’s law: Dem. 21. Midias 154; another develop-
ment was that trierarchs might avoid personal involvement by paying a contractor to do their work for them: 
e.g. Dem. 51. Trierarchic Crown 7, 21; Midias 80. Periander’s law: [Dem.] 47. Evergus & Mnesibulus 21 
with Dem. 14. Symmories 16–17; trierarchs and symmoria-members: MacDowell 1990: 372–373, Gabrielsen 
1994: 182–199; Demosthenes in 354/353: Dem. 14. Symmories. Leptines’ law and Demosthenes’ attack on it 
in 355/354 (Dem. 20. Leptines) show that there were difﬁ culties in ﬁ nding men to perform festival liturgies 
too.
75  First use of term epidosis 394: Isae. 5. Dicaeogenes 37–38; “ﬁ rst” appeal 357: Dem. 21. Midias 
160–161 (MacDowell 1990: 381 suggests the ﬁ rst appeal for volunteers to donate ships and serve as their 
trierarchs).
76  Iphicrates: Dem. 23. Aristocrates 129; Anaxandridas, fr. 42 Kassel & Austin; Athens and the three 
claimants: Dem. 23. Aristocrates 163–173, cf. IG II2 126 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 47.
77  Argaeus and Amphipolis: Diod. Sic. 16.2.1, 2.4–3.7, 4.1, 8.3; cf. Theop., FGrH 115 FF 30, 42; Dem. 
23. Aristocrates 116, 1; Olynth. 1. 8, 2. Olynth. 2. 6; [Dem.] 7. Halonnesus 27; Aeschin. 2. Embassy 33, 70, 3. 
Ctesiphon 54; Isoc. 5. Philip. 2; de Ste. Croix 1963 demonstrated the impossibility of a secret treaty between 
Athens and Philip but not the impossibility of secret talks. Pydna, Potidaea, Methone: Diod. Sic. 16.8.3–5, 
31.6, 34.4–5, cf. Dem. 23. Aristocrates 116, 1. Olynth. 1. 9, 2. Olynth. 2. 6–7.
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since Leuctra.78 But in 356 and 355 leading members of the League – Rhodes, Chios, 
Cos, Byzantium – which had been approached by Thebes in the 360’s and were now 
encouraged by Mausolus of Caria, fought against Athens in the Social War. Shockingly, 
the Athenians were defeated in naval battles, at Chios and at Embata; after Embata the 
general Chares retired into the service of the rebel satrap Artabazus, and that led to 
threats that Persia would give its support to Athens’ rebels, so the war came to an end 
with Athens’ rebels leaving the League.79
So in about ﬁ fteen years after Leuctra Athens revived former imperial practices, and 
tried to recover former possessions; but it could not pay for what it was trying to do, it 
did not achieve its major objectives, it alarmed League members even though it did not 
take direct action against most of them, and in the Social War it was defeated in naval 
battles by the rebels. Some Athenians thought that enough was enough. That reﬂ ecter 
of opinion Isocrates, who in his (4) Panegyric had defended the Delian League and 
advanced Athens’ claim to be the leader of Greece once more, in (8) On the Peace at 
the end of the Social War urged Athens to “stop coveting a maritime empire ... which is 
neither just nor possible to bring about nor advantageous” – though he naïvely suggested 
that if the Athenians underwent this conversion other Greeks would be so impressed 
that they would freely grant them ô@ Uáõô™í (the Chersonese and Amphipolis) and 
more besides.80 Xenophon’s Poroi seems to reﬂ ect policies advocated by Eubulus after 
the Social War: to revive trade by making Athens more attractive to metics and visiting 
merchants, to invite investment in a capital fund to be spent on facilities for traders, to 
make more of the silver mines – and, to underpin all of this, to have peace.81 I believe that 
we should attribute to Eubulus and Diophantus and date to the late 350’s the creation of 
the theoric fund, which not only subsidised citizens’ theatre tickets but built up a surplus 
to be spent for purposes of which its treasurer approved, and which shifted the balance 
of Athens’ priorities by receiving not only an allowance in the merismos but any surplus 
revenue beyond the sums bespoken for the merismos, whereas previously it is likely that 
surpluses had gone to the stratiotic fund.82 There is no doubt that between the time of 
the Social War and the time of Alexander Athens did once more become a prosperous 
state, and that this was achieved by cutting back on military expenditure as well as by 
increasing revenue.
This brings us to Philip of Macedon and the Athenians’ responses to him. At the 
beginning of his reign his hints over Amphipolis weakened the Athenians’ support for 
Argaeus and left them feeling cheated, but no Macedonian king had caused them seri-
ous trouble before: Philip had to be taken into account, just like his predecessors, but 
at ﬁ rst the Athenians still thought they would capture Amphipolis in the end. Eubulus’ 
78  Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 85; IG II2 124 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 48: see the com-
mentary of Rhodes/Osborne 2003 for the chronology of this episode and the Social War.
79  Diod. Sic. 16.7.3–4, 21.1–22.2; cf. Isoc. 8. Peace 16; Dem. 15. Freedom of Rhodians 3, 26. There is 
no other evidence that Cos was a member of the League, but it is not unlikely.
80  Stop coveting: Isoc. 8. Peace 64–66; other Greeks will grant: §§ 22–23.
81  Trade: Xen. Poroi 2–3; mines: ch. 4; peace: ch. 5.
82  Creation of fund: Just. 6.9.1–5; schol. Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 24 (65 Dilts); surpluses: [Dem.] 59. 
Neaera 4–6; Dem. 1. Olynth. 1.19–20, 3. Olynth. 3.10–11, 19. Embassy 291; Liban. hyp. Olynth. 1. 5. See 
Rhodes 1972: 105–107, cf. 235–240; and the discussions of Hansen 1976, and Harris 1996 = 2006: 121–139.
The Alleged Failure of Athens in the Fourth Century 123
policy seems to have involved giving up such ambitions: the Athenians would still react 
when directly threatened, as they did in 352 when Philip advanced beyond Thessaly to 
Thermopylae, and Diophantus proposed the decree of thanksgiving afterwards;83 as they 
did again in thinking Euboea, through which an attacker from the north could by-pass 
Thermopylae, more important than Olynthus in 349/348. At ﬁ rst Demosthenes seems to 
have been no more worried than anybody else about Philip; but in 352 his speech (23) 
Against Aristocrates identiﬁ es Philip as Athens’ greatest enemy, and the (4) First Philip-
pic followed in 351 or 350.84 The message of that was that Athens had suffered by letting 
Philip make the running, and ought instead to take the initiative and make trouble for 
Philip as near to the heart of his kingdom as possible. In the early years of Philip’s reign, 
when nobody yet realised the danger which he presented, that might have worked; but 
in those years the danger was not realised and Athens was quarrelling with the members 
of its League, and by the time Demosthenes advocated the policy it was too late: Philip 
was by then too secure in the north to be vulnerable to what Athens could do against him.
Philip was advancing eastwards into Thrace, which would take him to the Helles-
pont, and thanks to the Third Sacred War he was advancing southwards into central 
Greece, which would take him uncomfortably near to Athens.85 In the east Cersebleptes 
became worried enough to grant the Chersonese to Athens, and cleruchs were sent there 
in 353/352; in 352, when Philip after being checked at Thermopylae switched his at-
tention to Cersebleptes, the Athenians voted to send a relief expedition, but ran out of 
momentum on hearing that Philip was ill.86 By 349/348 Olynthus, favoured by Demos-
thenes because to defend it would ﬁ t the strategy of the First Philippic, was surrounded 
by Philip’s territory, and it is hard to think that a greater effort by Athens could have kept 
it safe for long. Whether Philip was involved in the Euboean affair is uncertain,87 and 
how an intervention which began well ended in disaster is mysterious. Not only are the 
men involved in that intervention linked in various ways with Eubulus, but after Athens’ 
failures in Olynthus and Euboea it was Eubulus who was responsible for a ﬁ rst series of 
embassies to arouse the southern Greeks against Philip.88 In 346 Philip was expected to 
intervene on a large scale in the Sacred War once more, and further Athenian embassies 
83  Diod. Sic. 16.38.1–2; Iust. 8.2.8–12; Dem. 19. Embassy 84, 86, with schol. 86 (199, 201 Dilts); for 
Diophantus, cf. Cawkwell 1963b: 48.
84  Dem. 23. Aristocrates 121, cf. 107–113, 116; 352/351: Dion. Hal. 725–726 Amm. 4; 353/352: Lane 
Fox 1997: 183–187; 4. Phil. 1. 352/351: Dion. Hal. 725. Amm. 4; 350/49: Lane Fox 1997: 195–199.
85  In the Third Sacred War Athens backed the eventual losers, the Phocians who seized Delphi in 356. 
The war was provoked by the Thebans’ political exploitation of Delphi, against which the Athenians had 
reacted in 363 by harbouring men exiled from Delphi and proclaiming that their exile was “contrary to the 
laws of the Amphictyons and the Delphians” and invalid (SIG3 175) – but Boeotia suffered badly during the 
war and the Thebans did not proﬁ t from being on the winning side.
86  Chersonese: Diod. Sic. 16.34.4; IG II2 1613, 297–298; Philip’s campaign: schol. Aeschin. 2. Embassy 
81 (178 Dilts); Theop., FGrH 115 F 101; Dem. 4. Phil. 1. 40–1; 3. Olynth. 3.4–5.
87  He is mentioned in the manuscript text of Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 87 and by Plut. Phoc. 12.1: on the 
basis of schol. 86 (190 Dilts) Cawkwell 1962: 129 emended Philip to Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, but Philip 
is upheld by [Hammond]/Grifﬁ th 1979: 318 n. 2.
88  Phocion and Eubulus: e.g. Aeschin. 2. Embassy 184; Midias and Eubulus: Dem. 21. Midias 205–207; 
Hegesilaus and Eubulus: Dem. 19. Embassy 290; Eubulus and embassies: Dem. 19. Embassy 304; these em-
bassies rightly distinguished from those of early 346: e.g. [Hammond]/Grifﬁ th 1979: 330 n. 1.
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were sent out, but after he had come to an arrangement with the Phocian leader Phalaecus 
the Phocians rejected Athenian help and the Athenians made peace with Philip after all.
I resist the temptation to discuss the problems of the Peace of Philocrates in detail.89 
Eubulus and his associates had been planning to resist Philip but their plans had col-
lapsed; and now they were receptive of Philip’s hints that he would end the Sacred War 
on terms with which they would be happy. Demosthenes, it seems, since the fall of Olyn-
thus had been sulking: if the Athenians would not take his warnings seriously and resist 
Philip as he wanted, let them make peace on whatever terms they could get, and they 
would soon learn that Demosthenes had been right after all. Some men were opposed 
to peace on Philip’s terms, but Eubulus insisted that the alternative was an all-out war 
which would have to be paid for.90 Peace was made, but Philip’s hints turned out to have 
been deceptive: Eubulus’ associates wanted nevertheless to accept the unsatisfactory 
peace and make the best of it; some men clamoured for an immediate war; Demosthenes 
in (5) On the Peace wanted war but only when Philip had provided a justiﬁ cation for it.
What did Philip want, and what were the possibilities for Athens? I do not accept the 
theory that his hints were sincere, that he wanted to cooperate with Athens, but his plan 
was wrecked by Demosthenes. I do not accept that Isocrates’ (5) Philip and a statement 
by Diodorus are sufﬁ cient evidence that Philip was already in 346 thinking of a Persian 
war and wanted a cooperative Greece simply to pave the way for that.91 I think Greece 
was for him an objective in its own right, and the best indication of what he wanted is 
what he obtained after Chaeronea: a form of supremacy in which the Greeks were not 
conquered or directly ruled by him but were still compliant, yet were handled tactfully 
as subordinate allies. For most states that would be no worse than the conditions they 
had been accustomed to in the Greek world, but for Athens it would mean that archein 
had given way to douleuein. Until Philip’s deal with Phalaecus, Eubulus was no less op-
posed to him than Demosthenes, but disagreed only on where and how to resist; and it 
was Eubulus’ supporter Aeschines who in 348/347 reminded the Athenians of an earlier 
barbarian invader by reading out the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles.92 If a ghost 
was haunting Athens in the early 340’s it was the ghost of the Persian Wars rather than 
of the empire.
In the deal with Phalaecus, and then in his hints to the envoys, Philip simply outma-
noeuvred the Athenians, and even if the Athenians had been willing to abandon Eubulus’ 
ﬁ nancial policy they could not in the short term have undone Philip’s success. However, 
many Athenians were angry when it turned out that Philip’s hints had been false. Dem-
osthenes looked for trouble, and duly found it; Philip’s offers to renegotiate the Peace of 
Philocrates were met with demands which he could not have been expected to agree to. 
What is remarkable is that, despite his claims that the Athenians were unwilling to accept 
his hard message,93 Demosthenes succeeded in convincing not only Athens but many of 
the Greek states that Philip was a threat to their freedom. In 339/338 he did persuade the 
89  For a short account of my views see Rhodes 2010: 347–351.
90  Dem. 19. Embassy 291.
91  Hints sincere: Markle 1974; envisaging Persian war: e.g. [Hammond]/Grifﬁ th 1979: 458–463, 
cf. Diod. Sic. 16.60.4–5, but Demosthenes shows no knowledge of such plans until 10. Phil. 4. 32–34.
92  Dem. 19. Embassy 303–304.
93  E.g. Dem. 8. Chersonese 48–57, 9. Phil. 3.4.
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Athenians that surplus revenue should go not to the theoric but to the stratiotic fund.94 
At Chaeronea Philip faced a substantial alliance, and the largest Greek army that had 
been assembled since Plataea in 47995 – and the better commander and the better army 
won. The resistance was a valiant effort, and although Philip was not beaten it was not 
unthinkable that he could be beaten; I do not think more money would have made much 
difference; it is hard for us now to see things as the Athenians will have seen them in 
340–338, but I can believe that a majority of Athenians did agree with Demosthenes that 
Philip represented a major threat to them.
Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War had not been ﬁ nal, and it was not obvious 
that Athens’ defeat at Chaeronea would be ﬁ nal. The death of a Macedonian king often 
led to a disputed succession and a period of weakness – but in 336 it did not. Alexander 
might easily have been killed in the Balkans in 335 (when wishful thinking believed 
rumours that he had been killed96), or in Asia after that – but he was not. Demosthenes 
rejoiced at Philip’s death in 336, supported the rising of Thebes in 335.97 Such measures 
in Athens as the remodelling of the ephebeia show a determination not only to revive 
the Athenians’ morale but to be ready to seize the opportunity when one arose. There 
was one manifestation of the ghost of empire. When Athens had been great, it had been 
a naval power, and it must have been shocking that in the Social War Athens was de-
feated in naval battles. After the Social War there was no serious threat to Athens at sea, 
but an enlargement of the navy was begun in the time of Eubulus, and the enlargement 
was continued and triremes were replaced by up-to-date quadriremes and quinqueremes 
in the time of Lycurgus, until in the 320’s the Athenians had more warships than ever 
before, but no need for them and no men to row them.98 They decided not to join in the 
Spartan-led rising in 331–330, when their joining in might have made the rising more 
serious; they did lead a rising after Alexander’s death, to be defeated on land and at sea.99
I have argued that for the Greeks in general the hellenistic period was not noticeably 
worse than the classical: manoeuvring between the hellenistic kings did not differ too 
badly from manoeuvring between Athens, Sparta and Thebes, the kings did not often in-
terfere directly in the internal affairs of the cities, and the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues 
were better than the leagues of the classical period in that they were not dominated by 
major cities. Athens was no longer in a position to dominate, but for half a century it did 
what it could to play a major role in the new world.100 Some kings declared their com-
mitment to the freedom of the Greeks, and in making alliances with them I dare say the 
94  Philoch, FGrH 328 F 56a.
95  Plataea: 38,700 hoplites and more light-armed; Her. 9.28–30; Chaeronea: [Hammond]/Grifﬁ th 1979: 
599 with n. 4 suggests 35,000 infantry and up to 2,000 cavalry, confronting Philip’s over 30,000 infantry and 
2,000 cavalry (Diod. Sic. 16.85.5).
96  Balkans: Arr. Anab. 1.7.2–3; Granicus ﬁ rst of many occasions in Asia when Alexander’s life was in 
danger: Arr. Anab. 1.15.7–8; Diod. Sic. 17.20.6.
97  Philip’s death: Diod. Sic. 17.3.2, 5.1; Plut. Dem. 22.1–3; Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 77–78; Thebes: Diod. 
Sic. 17.8.5–6; Plut. Dem. 23.1–2; Alex. 11.6.
98  283 ships in 357/356: IG II2 1611.9 (but only 120 used at Embata in 355: Diod. Sic. 16.21.1); 349 in 
353/352: 1613.302; 392 triremes + 18 quadriremes = 410 in 330/329: 1627.266–269, 275–278; 360 triremes 
+ 50 quadriremes + 2 quinqueremes = 412 in 325/324: 1629.783–812 with Ashton 1979.
99  They used only 170 of their ships: cf. Morrison 1987.
100  See, on the general point, Rhodes/Lewis 1997: 542; on Athens in particular, Rhodes 2006.
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Athenians tried to believe that they were not (let us say) Ptolemising but Ptolemy was 
Atticising.101 Except between 307 and 295 there were Macedonian garrisons in Attica; 
in 307 ﬂ attery required the creation of new tribes named after the “liberator” Demetrius 
and his father Antigonus. Nevertheless in 279/278 Athens joined in an Aetolian-led de-
fence of Delphi against marauding Celtic tribes, and could believe that once more it was 
playing its part in Greek resistance to barbarian invaders. In 268/267 Athens, Sparta and 
other southern Greeks made an alliance with Ptolemy II against Antigonus Gonatas, to 
ﬁ ght the Chremonidean War, and they could think of this as a Greek alliance led by the 
now cooperating Athens and Sparta, with the support of the friendly Ptolemy, rather than 
as their being caught up in a war between Antigonus and Ptolemy. But Athens and its 
allies were defeated in the Chremonidean War, and for a short time after that there was 
direct Antigonid intervention in the internal affairs of Athens. That does mark the end of 
Athens’ attempts to be a leading city in Greece.
So what did go wrong? The ghost of empire can certainly be seen behind what hap-
pened to the Second Athenian League after Leuctra had made its original purpose irrel-
evant, but I do not think it can be blamed for the King’s Peace before or the successes 
of Macedon after. (The large navy of the Eubulan and Lycurgan period was a waste of 
money, but money was plentiful once more and it does not seem to have been a dam-
aging waste.) Nor should we let the orators persuade us that fourth-century Athenians 
were inferior to ﬁ fth-century Athenians, that everything might have been different if the 
poor had been more willing to give up their handouts and the rich more willing to pay 
eisphora. As for the calibre of leaders, it is certainly true that politicians and generals 
were seriously in danger of prosecution – the great Callistratus was acquitted in 366/365, 
but was condemned in absence in 361 and was put to death later when he risked return-
ing to Athens; Hansen lists fourteen eisangeliai against generals between 366/365 and 
356/355102 – but there was no shortage of men willing to face the danger, and I see no 
reason to think that there were more able men who were frightened out of public life. 
After the Peace of Philocrates Demosthenes did persuade the majority of the Athenians, 
and many other Greeks too, that his attitude to Philip was the right attitude – but still they 
were beaten at Chaeronea.
There was nothing fundamentally wrong in the state of Athens. Athens’ problem, as 
the British prime minister Harold Macmillan would have said, was “events, dear boy; 
events:”103 the Spartans’ success in the Hellespont in 387, which enabled them to impose 
the King’s Peace; the chances which gave Macedon Philip II, who was too clever diplo-
matically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians; Alexander’s succession in 
336 and his success and survival in his campaigns. J. Ober in his contribution to a book 
of historical speculations about What If? suggests that, with Sparta weakened by Thebes 
and Thebes destroyed by Alexander, if Alexander had been killed at the Granicus in 334 
Athens would once more have become the strongest state in Greece.104 But it was not to 
be.
101  Cf. what Agesilaus is alleged to have said about the King’s Peace, see above pp. 115–116 with n. 36.
102  Callistratus: Hansen 1975: nos. 83, 87; eisangeliai against generals: nos. 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 
93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102.
103  Alleged reply when asked what his greatest problem was (e.g. Knowles 1998: 202 no. 8).
104  Ober 1999.
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Finally, was Demosthenes right to be afraid of Philip’s supremacy? We might as well 
ask whether some people today are right to be afraid of the increasing power of the Euro-
pean Union over its member states. The beneﬁ ts of belonging to what you feel to be your 
own unit, free to take decisions based on its own interests, have to be weighed against 
the beneﬁ ts of belonging to a large and ﬂ ourishing combination, and there may be differ-
ent answers if you posit as the alternative independence for your own unit in a world in 
which the large combination does not exist or in a world in which the large combination 
does exist without you. I will say only that I can understand why the Athenians, after the 
history of the past hundred and ﬁ fty years, did let Demosthenes persuade them.
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